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The People's Republic of China and the United States (US) are strategic competitors; countries whose relations have been tense and whose interests are at times more in conflict than agreement. As Thucydides observed 2500 years ago, rising powers challenge the established international order. 2 Historians and researchers predict that even without war, the US and China will develop the major global rivalry of the twenty-first century, a rivalry that will force other countries to take sides and will involve all of the major elements of competition: military strength, economic well-being, influence among other nations, and values and practices that are accepted as international norms. 3 Three decades of economic reform have led to a comprehensive recasting of China's geostrategic priorities in its immediate periphery. As a part of the long term strategy, China is expanding its presence in South and Southeast Asia through investments, development assistance, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement, while asserting control over aspects of the regional environment. Indeed, China's rise has led to fear that it will soon overwhelm its neighbors and subsequently supplant the US as a global hegemon. 4 Chinese leaders assert, however, that the purpose of this growth is to expand its influence only in the region, not globally.
Myanmar sits at an important geostrategic location that connects the Indian subcontinent with China and the Indochina Peninsula. In the fluid strategic environment of the early 21st century, with the rise of China and India, together with the reengagement of the US in the region, Myanmar's important position is once again attracting world attention. Many analysts perceive that the future dynamics of regional security will largely depend on Sino-Myanmar relations. The Sino-Myanmar relationship is complex, involving layers of sometimes antithetical interests both in China and
Myanmar. Though engaging with Myanmar may be part of China's overall economic offensive as a "Soft Power" in the Southeast Asian region, its relationship with Myanmar is on a special footing because of strategic and geopolitical reasons, particularly access to the Indian Ocean. 5 Chinese influence in Myanmar prompted a reversal in Indian policy and increased concerns about China's heightened role in South and Southeast
Asia. The issue is of major policy interest to the US and its allies. Myanmar is not a client state of China, but the relationship creates dilemmas for both due to shifting dependencies at different levels and among different groups.
The year 2012 has transformed Myanmar from a country in total isolation and under military rule to a budding democracy, though it is being termed as a "Discipline Flourishing Democracy." 6 Introduction of sweeping reforms on political, social and economic fronts by Myanmar leadership in recent months had made the US rethink its policy. A string of visits from US officials to the country, as well as lifting of many restrictions, have ushered in a new era of diplomatic relations between the countries.
With the US reasserting itself in Asia and an emboldened China projecting military and economic power as never before, each side is trying to gain the advantage in economically struggling but strategically placed Myanmar. 7 For the US, having another country move from dictatorship toward democracy would be a political achievement;
having a friendly country on China's border would be a strategic one. 8 The recent development of US-Myanmar ties reflects hard calculations for China in an escalating battle with the US for regional influence. As Myanmar loosens the grip of decades of military dictatorship and improves ties with the US, China fears a threat to a strategic partnership that offers access to the Indian Ocean and a long-sought shortcut for oil deliveries from the Middle East. Retaining control over geo-strategically important South and Southeast Asia is quite significant for both China and the US in order for either to dominate greater Asia and the Pacific. Although Southeast Asian states favor US regional involvement, they do not want to be forced to choose between external powers. 9 In order to minimize the chances of inadvertently contributing to a growing security dilemma, the US must avoid unnecessarily strengthening Chinese paranoia about American intentions while building partnership in this region. Therefore, for the US, success in dealing with a rising China will rest on achieving desired effects through the instruments of power, fully understanding the difficulties and challenges that lie ahead in the twenty-first century.
This paper will analyze the Sino-Myanmar relationship in different perspectives and study the implications of Sino-Myanmar ties on the South and Southeast Asian region. It will then briefly highlight the US strategic interests in the region and finally, conclude with suggested policy strategies in dealing with a rising China in the South and Southeast Asia region.
Critical Analysis of Sino-Myanmar Relations
The relationship between China and Myanmar is often referred to in the Burmese language as "paukphaw" (fraternal 
The US Factor
There was a visible shift in the US policy towards South and Southeast Asia within a few months of Barack Obama taking over as President in 2009. This was the Obama Administration's effort to increase the visibility of the US in Asia, described as a strategic "pivot" and later a "rebalancing" toward Asia. 29 As part of this strategic shift the
US policy on Myanmar also changed, when in September 2009 Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton announced that the sanctions had not achieved their aim. She remarked, "Engagement versus sanctions is a false choice in our opinion. So going forward we will be employing both of these tools, pursuing our same goals. To help achieve democratic reform we will be engaging directly with Myanmar authorities." Japan and the US, whose oil imports from West Asia pass through these waters. 41 Therefore, as part of its "Look-East" policy, India raised the level of interaction with ASEAN in general and Myanmar in particular. It also suited Myanmar to counterbalance its total dependence on China for all its military and economic needs.
South and Southeast Asia will be the world's largest hub of trade by 2025.
Therefore, China is desperately trying to establish its dominance over these regions.
China has already surpassed the US in total trade with ASEAN countries and with the support of Myanmar wants to influence ASEAN trade. 42 A good Sino-Myanmar relationship provides China a strategic outlet to the Indian Ocean and dominance over this ocean will allow it to control most of the commercial sea lanes including the Strait of 49 In order to achieve India's strategic objective and to minimize Century Defense, US leaders confirmed these policies:
US economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the US military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Eliminating terrorism within the South Asian region is another US interest. This is a broader problem than merely eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Terrorist networks within the region have tentacles that extend beyond South Asia.
Since the archrivals India and Pakistan both have acquired nuclear capability, maintaining regional stability in South Asia is another concern for the US. The US is also concerned about Pakistan's nuclear assets falling into the hands of the violent extremists, which might provoke an armed confrontation between the two countries that could potentially escalate to the nuclear level. 60 In the case of China, Secretary of State Clinton acknowledged that Beijing represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the US has ever had to manage. 61 The US perceives China as a significant strategic concern across the entire Indo-Pacific. 62 US policy makers reaffirmed that the US is trying to cooperate strategically and economically with China in order to build mutual trust and encourage China's efforts in assisting on a range of global issues. However, the US is concerned about the transparency of China's military modernization, human rights transgressions, and unpredictability on a range of significant challenges including North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, the South China Sea, and freedom of navigation more generally. 63 
Economic Interests
Pursuing a confident and aggressive trade and economic strategy is a key feature of the Obama Administration's 'rebalancing' towards Asia. In South Asia, the most important enduring national interest of the US is economic prosperity. According to the World Bank, by 2020 Asia could become the world's largest center of economic activity, with its share of world GDP projected to reach close to 35 percent. Despite the global recession South Asia is poised to grow by about 7 percent in 2010 and nearly 8 percent in 2011. 64 Helping South Asia to realize its great economic potential will not only benefit the people of this region, but also the US. On the other hand, ASEAN has the third-largest economy in Asia, after Japan and China. As a developing region, its per capita income is low but its GDP is rapidly growing. 65 A dynamic economy in these regions will provide an impetus for continued global economic growth.
The region is essential to the success of President Obama's National Export Initiative, which is to double US exports by 2015 and create new American jobs.
Through APEC and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, the US can continue to advance regional economic integration, and by reducing barriers to trade and investment in the region, it can increase exports and support jobs at home at the same time. 66 Regional security and stability are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for the economies of the South and Southeast Asian countries to grow and achieve prosperity. If the US hopes to promote regional security and stability, it needs to be involved in the region politically, economically and militarily. The China-Myanmar nexus is designed within the framework of China's broader regional policy that is partly aimed at stabilizing and consolidating its interests and influence in Asia. The policy is also meant to cultivate allies on broader policy positions against western countries, and in particular the United States, on issues such as democracy, press freedom, and human rights. The nexus is embedded in the Chinese overall strategy to challenge US hegemony in the region in pursuance of its global leadership. Avery Goldstein asserts that China seeks to foster conditions that support China's growth and modernization without encouraging others to conceive of China as a threat. 72 If the US fails to respond adequately to China's buildup, it could undermine the credibility of the security guarantees that it extends to its Asian allies, significantly affecting the status quo in the region. 73 Now that the US has reoriented its focus to the Asia-Pacific, it needs an appropriate strategy in response to China's rise in South and Southeast Asia.
US Strategic Interests in
The US has two fundamental options for responding to China's expansion in South and Southeast Asia; both require the incorporation of all elements of national power. First, the US may hedge against China's growing competitive role in South and Southeast Asia by increasing US presence in Asia to contain China's increasing power in the region. Second, the US may pursue a strategy of combining engagement and balancing. Engagement would be geared toward enmeshing China in global trade and international institutions, discouraging it from challenging the status quo, and giving it incentives to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the existing international system.
Balancing can maintain stability and deter aggression or attempts at coercion while engagement builds relationships and obligations. 74 The first option is likely to affect regional stability as it might lead to an escalation of violence between the two strategic competitors. Moreover, it would also prevent the US from exploiting mutual benefits and integrating China into the prevailing global system as a responsible stakeholder. By contrast, the second option supports the US objective to ensure a stable economic and political interest in the region; it also balances China's buildup while maintaining its status as the global leader. The option would require a concentrated effort using all elements of power to reassure China that cooperation with the United States will benefit China's interests. This option would require not only bilateral agreements with China, but also multilateral agreements between the US, China, and countries in Asia with mutual interests.
Successfully implementing the strategy of balancing and engaging a rising China would necessitate the US adopting a system of alliances or regional institutions, or a combination of alliances and regional institutions. Some analysts argue that even while adopting a system of alliances, Washington and its allies and partners should invest in maintaining the US system's predominance in Asia. This position of strength would keep the costs prohibitively high for any Asian power with aspirations to regional leadership. 75 The stability and certainty provided by a robust US alliance system would ensure continued prosperity and discourage potential challengers from upending the continuity of Asia's security order. On the other hand, regional institutions help to reduce tensions and suspicion while contributing to regional stability. The success of ASEAN in shelving regional tensions and disputes bolsters arguments that Asia's future stability lies in multilateral institutions rather than bilateral alliances. Enhanced regionalism seeks to socialize away impulses toward hierarchy and rivalry through the repeated engagement of Asian countries in disaster relief, joint exercises, military exchanges, peacekeeping, patrolling against transnational threats and second-track discussions. 76 Finally, a combination of alliances and regional institutions implies that by investing in the alliance system and thus raising the costs to a challenger, the United States and its allies can deter China from taking on the status quo. The counterpart to this "hard"
balancing is "soft" engagement through regional institutions where the deeper engagement of China will help socialize Beijing into accepting the status quo. The rationale is to soften the confrontational aspect of hard balancing while closing off China's other options to being socialized through regional institutions. 77 
Strengthen Diplomatic Efforts
Despite many diverging national interests and beliefs between the US and China, the US should find a way to remove the mistrust and expect China to transform into a democratic state, embracing the ideals, values and interests that come with it. However, democracy is an unreliable predictor of allegiance to likeminded democracies; a democratic China will be no different. 78 Striving to stay neck-and-neck with China in Southeast Asia, or launching an attempt at containing China in that region is likely to backfire on the US because spending resources in the region to hedge against China might alienate potential allies, who would be uncomfortable at being forced to choose between two dominant powers. Therefore, the US must carefully calibrate its approach in Southeast Asia, focusing on three fundamental considerations. 79 First, the US must strengthen bilateral ties in ways that are not threatening to China. Second, it must invest in ASEAN and related organizations that integrate the US into the region and provide opportunities for engagement. And finally, it must encourage critical regional (Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand) and extra-regional (Japan, India, Korea, Australia) actors to strengthen mutual ties. The US would benefit from putting more diplomatic effort into consulting and coordinating with regional states in advance of ASEAN-related summits and ministerial meetings.
The US should foster the growing multi-polarity of the region along with other key extra-regional players such as India, Japan, and Australia-gently balancing China and offering a welcoming hedge for ASEAN nations. By strengthening its engagement without directly challenging China, the US can position itself as a power broker without spooking allies who wish to avoid choosing between the United States and the rising regional power. However, there are likely to be occasions when the US must confront
China over challenges to its strategic interest in freedom of navigation throughout Asia's international waterways -as with the incident involving Chinese harassment of the USS Impeccable in 2009. 80 The US, as guarantor of the "global commons", will need to use a variety of means to assert said freedom, including potentially high-visibility acts such as sailing gray-hulled vessels through sensitive areas. However, given the integral role that China plays in managing many threats to US interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the US may help in forming a cooperative management regime to solve the territorial disputes in the South China Sea based on a functional approach that exploits the common interests of claimant countries. 81 ASEAN and China should negotiate the establishment of setting up a management body.
India is considered by the US "to be one of the defining partnerships in the AsiaPacific." The two nations have begun a strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific region, along with an embryonic trilateral relationship between Japan, India, and the US. The US has also supported India's "Look East" policy, highlighted by the annual Malabar military exercises. 82 New Delhi and Washington share common interests in the region:
the danger of maritime piracy, the emergence of China, and the protection of the SLOCs. The Indian Ocean is the arena where the India-China rivalry will play out. US strategic goals align well with India's, and US interests would be well served by treating the Indian Ocean as a single policy space. 83 However, the smaller South Asian countries, especially Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, will play a greater role in the dynamics of the Indian Ocean region than traditional US policy would indicate. Engaging Sri Lanka will not only contribute in influencing the Indian Ocean but is likely to affect China's 'String of Pearls' strategy to secure its long SLOC in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, Bangladesh with its geostrategic importance, firm stance against terrorism, and India being a close ally during its War of Liberation, will positively contribute in achieving US objectives in the region.
Realign Military Forces
The most resolute and visible aspect of US national power lies in the military.
Any US strategy in Asia must seek to develop new methods and capabilities to sustain a level of credible deterrence in the region while simultaneously strengthening alliances and enhancing new relationships. The US must recognize that the best way to avoid great power conflict is to remain vigilantly prepared. The US should fundamentally re-examine how it uses bases and friendly ports to project and support military power in the region. 84 A new approach to basing in Asia looks to Oceania and South and Southeast Asia as potential dispersed staging areas to maintain a US military presence beyond the range of Chinese ballistic missiles. 85 This approach deemphasizes the importance of existing South and Southeast Asia to conduct security cooperation and capacity-building operations with new partners.
While this is certainly a prudent strategy when considering the threat posed by
Chinese anti-access strategies, it is in itself inadequate to address the broader challenge of system management in a multi-polar era. Bases are an essential aspect of America's engagements with its regional allies and partners throughout the region, whose main motivation to support such facilities is the belief that they contribute to their own security. Therefore, while major bases in Japan and Korea can be somewhat reduced to allow for a more flexible force posture, they should also be sustained and modernized to account for future threats. Existing bases must be hardened and protected against precision strikes, and the US military should examine options to use them to support a more widely distributed force posture. A reduction in the committed defense resources due to US defense spending cuts may create a capability gap in the Indian Ocean region. This may be partially ameliorated by the shift in defense resources from the Northwest Pacific towards the Southwest Pacific (Australia, Singapore and Guam) for deployment in the Indian Ocean in response to specific threats. 86 In balancing China, the United States should develop options to escalate horizontally instead of relying on the prospect of escalation to ever-higher levels of violence. Enhancing the ability to respond to aggression by joining with a coalition of maritime friends and allies to cut China's SLOC remains the focus of such strategy. 87 Even if Beijing believed that it could use force to achieve a quick victory over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, for example, it would then face the prospect of losing the ability to export goods by sea or to import the energy and other resources it needs to keep its economy running. The United States can enhance the credibility of this threat by investing more in undersea warfare technologies; by deepening its cooperation with the navies of Australia, India, and Japan, among others; and by supporting Southeast Asian nations' efforts to acquire the weapons they need to defend their own airspace and coastal waters. Possible trilateral co-operation between the US, India and Australia may fit neatly into this context, particularly if broadened to include disaster response management.
While building the capacity of its allies and strengthening the strategic partnership, Washington should reassure Beijing that these moves are intended to create a balance of common interests rather than to threaten China. That assurance can be achieved by strengthening existing mechanisms for managing US-Chinese military interactions. 88 For example, the existing Military Maritime Consultative Agreement should be used to design procedures that would allow US and Chinese aircraft and naval vessels to operate safely when in close proximity. Thus, leveraging allies must be part of a wider military strategy that seeks to draw in China as part of an Asia-centric alliance system, in which militaries cooperate on a multitude of issues. However, with the growing expectation of a US military drawdown, the US will rely heavily on engagement strategies. It would also seek to avoid military intervention everywhere; but instead buildup its regional allies to maintain the balance of power.
Washington should accept that the best avenue for countering Beijing's regional preeminence is through local Asian balancing behaviors, which present China with a much more complicated challenge than direct military competition with the US.
American and Asian interests should coincide here in using these new dynamics of rivalry as stabilizing forces for the region. 90 Going forward, the US should work closely with regional organizations such as SAARC, ASEAN, and the Malacca littoral states to encourage robust and effective intra-regional cooperation. Further, the US should act as a bridge to improve regional cooperation by expanding military exercises from bilateral to multilateral. The more the US can facilitate collaboration among its allies, the stronger it will be.
Pursue Strategic Trade
China's massive bilateral trade surplus with the US and Beijing's accumulation of dollar-denominated assets are worrisome for reasons that transcend economics. If
Washington wants to retain the greatest possible freedom of action, it cannot stay so deeply indebted to its main geopolitical rival. 91 As the economies of the South and the Sino-Myanmar partnership has evoked deep concern among China-wary countries like India. As India embarks on a more forceful policy of internal and external balancing towards China, it will view the US as a critical balancer in the India-US-China triangular relationship and will look to Washington for support as both Sino-Indian and Sino-US competition enter into sharper relief in the coming years. India's burgeoning relationship with the US gives New Delhi crucial strategic room to maneuver vis-à-vis China. 95 The US faces the prospect of an emerging power transition in Asia, and a robust partnership with India will be a valuable asset in stabilizing the region's strategic landscape.
Both the US and India have some common interests in Myanmar. Therefore, the US may identify the Indian interests in Myanmar and assist them as a part of confidence building. The US and India may be engaged more closely on the significant political changes currently underway in Myanmar. US-India joint naval exercises, and an upgrading of Indian naval bases, may solidify their strength in the Indian Ocean.
Another key issue could be the Myanmar-India gas pipeline project, which has not materialized yet due to lack of funding. The US may identify such strategic projects and render financial and technical support in pursuit of its own strategic goals.
As the US sensibly pursues a stronger strategic partnership with India, it should avoid the temptation of adopting India's long-standing approach of isolating and containing Pakistan. Tensions between India and Pakistan have had a profound effect on limiting Pakistani support for the US effort in Afghanistan. Pakistan is not likely to be the strategic ally the US wants or needs so long as Pakistan's overriding security concerns emanate from India. 96 Given the current lack of leverage that the US has over Pakistani decision-making, a patient and diplomatic engagement strategy remains the best option for regional stability. 97 Moreover, the US should offer assistance to both India and Pakistan in securing its nuclear sites and weaponry to decrease the risk of nuclear material falling into the wrong hands or rogue state agents. Reducing IndiaPakistan tensions will alleviate the need for Pakistan to continue its support for terrorist proxies and bring their national security interests more in line with those of the US. 98 The US should also encourage India to enhance mutual cooperation and ease the discomforts with its smaller neighbors to discourage them from strengthening ties with
China.
Develop Relations with Myanmar
Finally, the US efforts to forge stronger ties with Myanmar should continue in the future focusing on political reforms and promoting democratic rights. Investments and bi-lateral trade will play pivotal roles in consolidating the US-Myanmar ties. 99 
Conclusion
China's Myanmar policy has been in accordance with its overall policy towards a stable external environment for its own modernization and development. Christopher H.
Stephens noted, "The Chinese take a long-term perspective to secure strategic resources rather than a short term investment perspective." 101 The perception of the rise of China in South and Southeast Asia depends to a great extent on whether the rise of China is viewed in zero-sum or variable-sum terms relative to American interests. Asian context. These are: the ability of the US to remain committed to the region and play a leading role in "creating a new security architecture," the rise of China, and a deteriorating arc of instability in Asia. 103 From this perspective, the ability of the US to remain committed to the region, beyond a narrow focus on the war against terror, is an important factor that will likely influence how regional states react to the rise of China. If regional states perceive the US as unwilling or unable to play an active role across the economic, diplomatic, and security spectrum in South and Southeast Asia, they may be increasingly drawn to China.
The US policy of 'Pivot to Asia' -a strategy that some says was meant to check a rising China -has sparked China's combativeness and damaged its faith in cooperation. Many scholars and analysts view that the pivot has already damaged US security interests, and the cost will only grow. If Washington continues down its current path, Chinese resistance to US policies will inevitably increase, preventing bilateral cooperation on crucial issues from trade to global economic stability. 104 The outbreak of hostilities in the region will become a real possibility, as China pushes back against the growing US presence on its borders. This would also cause the rise of nationalist tension between China and US security partners over disputed but inconsequential islands. The US could respond to China's tough diplomacy with policies that would both sustain the regional order and minimize the chances of a US-Chinese conflict. The better alternative for both China and the US is to create a new equilibrium of power that maintains the current world system, but with a larger role for China.
Finally, the China-Myanmar nexus is designed within China's grand strategy to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and become a global power in the 21 st Century. Lixin Geng noted that by the year 2050 China is expected to achieve world-class blue water naval status, and Myanmar would be crucial for China's multidirectional access to both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 105 Therefore, in view of China's long-term strategy and its growing strategic distrust of the US, it is essential for the US to reorient its strategy for the South and Southeast Asian region to maintain regional stability ensuring its global leadership. The US, while supporting Myanmar's political reform and consolidating its ties with the country, needs to engage and balance the rising China using all elements of national power to deter China from undermining the US position in the region.
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